In this section you can check some of my research publications, academic and policy related.
For a broader inspection you can also have a look at my google scholar profile [here].

​
Published Books

​Business Lobbying
​in the
European Union
​
​[Oxford University Press, 2021]

In this monograph with David Coen and Matia Vannoni we provide an in-depth and multi-angle analysis of business-government relations in the EU over the last 30 years.​
​Contributing to discussions on corporate political strategy and interest groups activity, this monograph should be of interest to public policy scholars, policy-makers, and businesses managers seeking to understand EU government affair and political representation.​

Publications in Peer Reviewed Academic Journals

Introducing the PFxEU tracker dataset: Tracking political financing in the European Union​

This article presents the PFxEU tracker, an open-access dataset that tracks the financial donations received by European Union political parties. It systematically codes (a) each donation received; (b) its amount; (c) the type of donor; and (d) its region of origin.  It systematically codes (a) each donation received; (b) its amount; (c) the type of donor; and (d) its region of origin.

Regulating government affairs: Integrating lobbying research and policy concerns

How can government regulations be brought up to speed to address 21st-century lobbying practices?  In this paper with D. Coen and M. Vannoni we argue that there are three critical dimensions to focus on: (i) regulatory consolidation; (ii) system interoperability; and (iii) open-source implementation. These aspects address the need for better coordination within jurisdictions, cooperation across systems, and effective use of public resources.

On David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis and Matia Vannoni’s Business Lobbying in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2021

In this symposium review we draw from the monograph on Business Lobbying in the EU, review, consider, and discuss the state-of-the-art in the field, and provide some potential future research trajectories.

Following the Money:
​Exploring Business Financial Contributions to the European Union's Political Parties​

​Do business groups donate to the European Union's (EU) political parties?  This is the first piece to explore the direction of business donations to the EU's political parties. ​It systematically maps and analyses the entire population of donations given to EU political parties from 2008 to 2015.
​The results show that business interests follow a selective strategy targeting with their donations right-wing parties; with Eurosceptic parties performing better than pro-integration parties. ​

Accountability Through Mutual Attunement:
​How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected.

In this innovative paper with A. Eriksen we propose a alternative model of accountability relations which presupposes a process of working-out shared understandings of the ends, means and circumstances of policy needs.
​We test our model on an a case study assessing the interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs and the European Securities and Markets Authority

Hedging Bets; British Business Lobbying in the European Union post-Brexit

How & Why will Brexit change UK Business Lobbying in Brussels? In this article with D. Coen we draw from work on corporate political activity, and outline changes that UK business lobbying faces in Brussels post-Brexit, focussing on three key aspects: (i) changes at the institutional-systemic level; (ii) variance across policy fields; (iii) engagement with other organisations. In addition, we discuss some potential strategic responses for UK business and argues that lobbying for UK private interests will become a costlier and more complicated enterprise. 

Between cheap talk and epistocracy: The logic of interest group access in the European Parliament's committee hearings​

The European Parliament's committee hearings remain an understudied area of European governance. In this paper, we build on theoretical work on interest group access and deliberation We construct a set of measures and assess an entire population of participants in hearings (2009–14). ​Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on interest group access while providing an innovative set of tools for its measurement, and the first dataset of its kind.

Governance, accountability, and political legitimacy:
​Who participates in the European parliament’s committee hearings

Drawing from theories on resource-exchange and institutional legitimacy, we argue that committee hearings allow the EP to demonstrate its relevance as a political authority. We test our argument, focusing on the Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs (ECON). Through an unprecedented systematic analysis of its hearings; we provide a fine-grained identification of all participants across two legislatures (2004-2014)

Lobbying Brexit Negotiations:
Who Lobbies Michel Barnier?
​


​​This article contributes to discussions surrounding Brexit and institutional change in the EU, focusing on Article 50 negotiations and stakeholder engagement.
We argue that different groups are given access to the Chief Negotiator depending on the resources they can contribute. Assessing our expectations, we inspect the entire interest group population that held meetings with Michel Barnier and his team from 2016 onwards. 

Deliberative layering:
​Explaining diverse interest mobilization across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle

In this paper with Wilhelm Lehmann and David Coen, we conceptually frame why and when different types of interests mobilize across the parliamentary policy cycle. We posit that each policy stage holds its own deliberative purpose and logic, leading to a variation in the type and volume of information demanded. We test our argument, following a unique survey of Members of European Parliament.

Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness:
The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament

Different procedures bestow a different type of authority to parliamentary committees in turn impacting the balance between private and public interests mobilised. We assess a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists. We provide a novel approach for framing the committee’s nature from a procedural perspective, bridging discussions on interest group mobilisation and the democratic deficit. Empirically, the results overturn the premise of business dominance across the institution’s committees through a unique dataset.

Chameleon pluralism
in the EU:
an empirical study of the European Commission interest group density and diversity across policy domains

Bridging theoretical considerations on input/output legitimacy with informational approaches, we argue that different policy domains demand different types of legitimacy that are supported by the provision of different types of information (technical/political). Bridging theoretical considerations on input/output legitimacy with informational approaches, we argue that different policy domains demand different types of legitimacy that are supported by the provision of different types of information (technical/political).​

Book Chapters

Accountability beyond control
How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?​

According to standard democratic theory, expert authority is legitimate when constrained to finding technical means to political ends set by electorally accountable bodies, hence the dominant principal-agent perspective on the accountability of experts and concerns controlling that delegated ends have been appropriately pursued. In this book chapter, we discuss a novel normative argument, we propose an alternative model to the strict division of labour that characterises principal-agent approaches, which we refer to as mutual attunement.​

EU Democratic Deficit(s) and Legitimacy; System Versus Sub-System Level
​

Despite theoretical work on the importance of civicity and representativeness for modern democracies, less has been done to connect research on interest groups and the democratic deficit of the EU. This chapter links democratic deficit frames with post-modern legitimacy conceptualizations. Different legitimacy demands (input, output) across the EU’s sub-systems lead to variation in the activity of interest groups (public, private) that supply it. Utilizing research on 4,000 interest groups from the Register of Interest Representatives, the analysis indicates that different frames of the democratic deficit apply across Directorate Generals (DGs). 

Policy Papers


​Institutional and Constitutional Aspects of Special Interest Representation​

​[European Parliament, Study 2015]

To this date, one of the most extensive studies of interest group mobilization in the European Parliament, conducted for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The European Parliament is lobbied by growing numbers of special interests; their activity is greater in Committees dealing with issues on integration & regulation, and procedures under OLP, CNS and INI. Significantly, the density and diversity of accredited interests across committees mirrors patterns observed in registered groups across Commission DGs. Based on a survey of MEPs the report notes variation in the activity of interest groups across the policy cycle while influential groups are considered those that provide a mix of European level technical and political expertise; overall the Transparency Register is considered to improve the behaviour of interest representatives.
The study also provides policy recommendations regarding interest group mobilization in the EU considering issues of political equality, transparency and risks of institutional capture.

Assessing Interest Groups’ Financial Donations to 
the European Union’s Political Parties & 
Foundations​ 
​
[OECD, Corruption Forum 2018]

This policy piece is the first to assess political financing in the European Union. It conducts a detailed micro-analysis of all donations and donors from 2008 to 2015. Contrary to our understanding of European parties as public utilities, donations in Brussels have increased considerably over time. Significantly, contrasting  information-access models we observe a polarized party-interest group linkage outside the European  Parliament’s setting, where right leaning organizations receive nearly the entirety of donations; while business organizations outspend all other donors. The results suggest that an alternative interest group  strategy is emerging in a system where the EU’s political organizations are moving beyond the institutional policy-making setting. Significantly, the analysis points to considerations of additional regulation in this area.